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Corporate ﬁnance and macroeconomics have studied in depth the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on
ﬁrm value, capital investment, and business cycles.1 A small but growing asset pricing literature
asks how these constraints aﬀect risk and expected returns. Using the Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
index of ﬁnancial constraints, Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001) report a puzzling ﬁnding that
more constrained ﬁrms earn lower average returns than less constrained ﬁrms. However, using an
alternative index estimated from investment Euler equation, Whited and Wu (2006) ﬁnd that more
constrained ﬁrms earn higher average returns than less constrained ﬁrms, although the diﬀerence
is insigniﬁcant. Finally, Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial constraints provide
a common factor for the cross section of returns, but somewhat surprisingly, the shadow price of
external funds is procyclical, so that ﬁnancial constraints are more binding in economic booms.
We use neoclassical economics to study the structural relations between ﬁnancial constraints,
stock returns, and economic ﬂuctuations. Conﬂicting evidence and competing interpretations are
diﬃcult to evaluate without models that tie the characteristics in question to risk and expected
returns. We try to ﬁll this gap using two dynamic models. In Model 1, ﬁrms face dividend nonneg-
ativity constraints without access to external equity or debt. Model 2 is more realistic as ﬁrms can
retain earnings, raise debt and equity, but face collateral constraints that limit their debt capacity.
Despite their diverse structures, these two models share largely similar predictions. Small ﬁrms,
less proﬁtable ﬁrms, and ﬁrms already in debt are more likely to be constrained. More important,
more constrained ﬁrms are riskier and earn higher expected returns than less constrained ﬁrms.
However, this eﬀect can largely be subsumed quantitatively by market capitalization and book-to-
market equity. Further, ﬁnancial constraints are more binding in economic booms, a pattern driven
by the stochastic discount factor that makes capital investment more sensitive to aggregate shocks.
1An incomplete list of this voluminous literature includes Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), Whited (1992), Bond and Meghir (1994), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kaplan and Zingales (1997),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Gomes (2001), Hennessy (2004), Moyen (2004),
Almeida and Campello (2005), and Henessy and Whited (2006).
2Our explicitly-solved models provide rich insights on the precise economic mechanisms driving
the model predictions. Intuitively, the shadow price of new funds for a given ﬁrm is determined
by its ﬁnancial gap, the diﬀerence between its investment demand and internal funds. The higher
the gap, the more ﬁnancially constrained the ﬁrm will be. For small ﬁrms with small scale of
production, internal funds are low, but investment demands are high because of decreasing return to
scale. Moreover, all else equal, ﬁrms with more debt have less internal funds available for investment
because of debt payments. Accordingly, small ﬁrms and ﬁrms already in debt are more constrained.
Aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks have two oﬀsetting eﬀects on the ﬁnancial gap.
A positive shock raises internal funds, but it also raises investment demands because the shock
increases the conditional mean of productivity. For ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, the eﬀect on internal funds
dominates, therefore more proﬁtable ﬁrms are less constrained. For aggregate shocks, the eﬀect on
investment demands dominates, therefore ﬁrms are more constrained in economic booms.
Our ﬁrst contribution concerns the role of the stochastic discount factor in driving the pro-
cyclical shadow price of external funds. Unlike ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, aggregate shocks can aﬀect the
stochastic discount factor, which provides a discount-rate channel through which aggregate shocks
can impact capital investment. Speciﬁcally, when a positive aggregate shock hits a ﬁrm, its real
investment increases because its capital stock becomes more productive (the cash-ﬂow channel).
But the positive aggregate shock also causes the aggregate discount rate to fall, which in turn
causes the net present value of an additional unit of investment to go up, stimulating investment
even further (the discount-rate channel). The increase in investment demands exceeds the increase
in internal funds, generating a higher ﬁnancial gap after the positive aggregate shock.
Our analysis explains why traditional, partial equilibrium investment models cannot generate
procyclical ﬁnancial constraints. These models typically assume constant discount factors. Aggre-
gate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks aﬀect investment symmetrically, therefore ﬁrms are more constrained
in bad times for the same reason why less proﬁtable ﬁrms are more constrained. Our analysis
also suggests that procyclical ﬁnancial constraints should appear in general equilibrium models
3with stochastic discount factors. Indeed, Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2003) show that the implied
shadow price of new funds is procyclical in several well-known general equilibrium models (e.g.,
Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999).
Our second contribution concerns the relation between ﬁnancial constraints and expected re-
turns. In our models, the shadow price of external funds is determined jointly with risk and expected
returns by underlying state variables. In equilibrium, small ﬁrms, less proﬁtable ﬁrms, and ﬁrms
in debt are riskier and earn higher expected returns. But these ﬁrms are also more ﬁnancially con-
strained, suggesting that more constrained ﬁrms are riskier and earn higher expected returns than
less constrained ﬁrms. This prediction arises because the shadow price contains information on the
underlying state variables that drive risk and expected returns. However, market capitalization
and book-to-market contain similar information. Using computational experiments, we ﬁnd that
sorting on the shadow price alone generates signiﬁcant average-return spreads, but the shadow price
largely loses its explanatory power once we control for market capitalization and book-to-market.
We also use our explicitly-solved models as laboratories to study quantitatively the empirical
determinants of the shadow price of external funds. Consistent with the evidence in Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) and Whited and Wu (2006), our quantitative results show that ﬁrms will be more
constrained ﬁnancially if they have lower cash ﬂow to assets, higher debt to assets, lower sales and
sales growth, lower dividends to assets, lower liquid assets or cash to assets, and higher Tobin’s Q.
More interesting, we run a horse race between the Kaplan-Zingales index and the Whited-Wu index
on our simulated data to evaluate their relative quality as empirical proxies for the shadow price
of external funds. We ﬁnd that, although both indexes are positively correlated with the shadow
price, the Whited-Wu index appears more powerful than the Kaplan-Zingales index.
Our paper provides a comprehensive, theoretical analysis of the structural relation between
ﬁnancial constraints and stock returns, facilitating the interpretation of the evidence in Lamont,
Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001), Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006), and Whited and Wu (2006). Our
modeling of debt dynamics is heavily inﬂuenced by Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2006), but we add
4aggregate shocks and asset pricing dynamics. More generally, our work belongs to the literature
that connects the cross section of returns to corporate policies and the real economy (e.g., Cochrane
1991, 1996; Berk, Green, and Naik 1999).2 We contribute to this literature by studying the impact
of ﬁnancial constraints and debt dynamics on risk and expected returns.
The rest of the itinerary is as follows. Section 2 constructs the dynamic models. Sections 3 and
4 present qualitative and quantitative analyses of the models, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Dynamic Models
We present two dynamic models of ﬁnancial constraints. In Model 1, ﬁrms have no access to external
equity markets, and cannot retain earnings or borrow debts. Although simplistic, this framework
has been used in much of the related literature, thereby providing a natural benchmark to start our
analysis. In Model 2, we allow ﬁrms to issue costly external equity, retain earnings, and borrow at
a risk-free rate. When borrowing, ﬁrms face collateral constraints that limit their debt capacity.
2.1 The Common Environment
We ﬁrst present the environment common to both Models 1 and 2.
Technology
The production function is given by:
yjt = ext+zjtkα
jt (1)
where yjt and kjt are the output and capital stock of ﬁrm j at period t, respectively. 0<α<1, so
the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Production is subject to both an
aggregate shock, xt, and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock, zjt.
The aggregate productivity shock has a stationary and monotone Markov transition function,
2An incomplete list of other examples includes Berk (1995), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003), Carlson, Fisher, and
Giammarino (2004, 2006), Kogan (2004), P´ astor and Veronesi (2005), Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006), and Gala (2006).
5denoted Qx(xt+1|xt), as follows:
xt+1 = x(1 − ρx) + ρxxt + σxεx
t+1 (2)
where εx
t+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal shock. In our models, the aggregate shock is the driving
force of economic ﬂuctuations and systematic risk.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks, denoted zjt, are uncorrelated across ﬁrms, indexed by j,
and have a common stationary and monotone Markov transition function, denoted Qz(zjt+1|zjt):
zjt+1 = ρzzjt + σzεz
jt+1 (3)
where εz
jt+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal shock. εz
jt+1 and εz
it+1 are uncorrelated with each other
for any pair (i,j) with i  = j. Moreover, εx
t+1 is independent of εz
jt+1 for all j. In our models, the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock is the ultimate driving force of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Stochastic Discount Factor
Following Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), we use partial equilibrium models to focus on the link
between corporate policies and expected returns. The omission of consumer behavior can hopefully
be compensated by ﬁrm dynamics often absent from consumption-based asset pricing models.
Speciﬁcally, we parameterize the stochastic discount factor as follows:
logmt+1 = logη + γt (xt − xt+1) (4)
γt = γ0 + γ1(xt − x) (5)
where mt+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor from time t to t+1. 1>η>0, γ0>0, and γ1<0
are constant parameters. Equation (4) can be motivated as a reduced-form representation of the
intertemporal rate of substitution for a ﬁctitious representative consumer. Following Zhang (2005),
we assume in equation (5) that γt decreases in xt−¯ x to capture time-varying price of risk.3
3We remain agnostic about the precise economic sources driving the countercyclical price of risk. Potential sources
include time-varying risk aversion in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), loss aversion in Barberis, Huang, and Santos
6The Operating-Proﬁt Function
The operating-proﬁt function for ﬁrm j with capital stock kjt, idiosyncratic productivity zjt, and
aggregate productivity xt is:
π(kjt,zjt,xt) = ext+zjtkα
jt − f (6)
where f >0 is nonnegative ﬁxed costs of production, which must be paid every period.
The Investment-Cost Function
When investing, ﬁrms incur purchase costs and capital adjustment costs. The total investment-cost
function, φ(ijt,kjt), is assumed to be asymmetric and quadratic:
φ(ijt,kjt) ≡ ijt +
aP1i









jt ≡ 1{ijt≥0} with 1{ } being the indicator function that equals one if the event described
in { } is true and zero otherwise. We assume aN >aP >0 to capture costly reversibility (e.g., Abel
and Eberly 1994, 1996; Hall 2001); intuitively, ﬁrms face higher costs per unit of adjustment in
cutting than expanding their capital stocks. Zhang (2005) uses asymmetric adjustment costs to
address the value premium, the stylized fact that value ﬁrms with high book-to-market ratios earn
higher returns on average than growth ﬁrms with low book-to-market ratios. We instead use the
neoclassical framework to address the relation between ﬁnancial constraints and expected returns.
2.2 Model 1: Dividend Nonnegativity Constraints
Model 1 captures ﬁnancial constraints by shutting down the external equity markets.
Dividend Nonnegativity Constraints
We ﬁrst model ﬁnancial constraints parsimoniously as follows:
djt ≡ π(kjt,zjt,xt) − φ(ijt,kjt) ≥ 0 (8)
(2001), and time-varying economic uncertainty in Bansal and Yaron (2004).
7Because negative dividends are equivalent to costless external equity, equation (8) basically denies
ﬁrms access to external equity. We also assume that ﬁrms cannot borrow or retain earnings.
Although simplistic, the dividend constraints are standard in the literature (e.g., Whited 1992,
Bond and Meghir 1994, Cooper and Ejarque 2003, Moyen 2004, Whited and Wu 2006, and Gomes,
Yaron, and Zhang 2006). We therefore use equation (8) as a natural benchmark to start our analysis.
Dynamic Value Maximization
Let v(kjt,zjt,xt) denote the market value of ﬁrm j. Using Bellman’s Principle of Optimality, we
can state ﬁrm j’s dynamic value-maximization problem as:
v(kjt,zjt,xt) = max
{kjt+1,ijt}
{π(kjt,zjt,xt) − φ(ijt,kjt) + Et [mt+1v(kjt+1,zjt+1,xt+1)]} (9)
subject to the equation of capital accumulation:
kjt+1 = ijt + (1 − δ)kjt (10)
and the dividend nonnegativity constraint (8). The ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side of (9)
reﬂect current dividends that equal proﬁts minus total investment costs.
The Shadow Price of New Equity
Let  jt≡ (kjt,zjt,xt) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the dividend nonnegativity con-
straint in equation (8). The multiplier can be interpreted as the shadow price of external equity;
the higher  jt is, the more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm j will be.





where vk and dk denote the ﬁrst-order derivatives of ﬁrm value and dividend, respectively, with
respect to capital stock, kjt. The interpretation of equation (11) is straightforward. All else equal,
ﬁrms with higher vk are more likely to be constrained. Intuitively, ﬁrms with higher marginal value
8of capital will have higher investment demands, and therefore higher demands for external equity.
Moreover, ﬁrms in which an additional unit of capital can generate more dividend or dk is higher
are less ﬁnancially constrained. This eﬀect is again intuitive because higher internal funds alleviate
the demands for external equity.
Risk and Expected Excess Return
Evaluating the value function in equation (9) at the optimum yields:
vjt = djt + Et [mt+1vjt+1]
which is equivalent to 1=Et [mt+1rjt+1], where the stock return rjt+1≡vjt+1/(vjt − djt). Note that
vjt is the cum-dividend ﬁrm value because it is measured before the dividend is paid out. We can
further rewrite 1=Et [mt+1rjt+1] as the beta-pricing form (e.g., Cochrane 2001, p. 19):
Et[rjt+1] − rft = βjtζmt (12)





and the price of risk is given by ζmt≡Vart[mt+1]/Et[mt+1].
2.3 Model 2: Collateral Constraints
Although useful as a ﬁrst stab at dynamic modeling of ﬁnancial constraints, Model 1 has several
unrealistic features. In particular, ﬁrms cannot issue equity, borrow debt, or retain earnings. We
now introduce a more realistic but more complex model in which the unpalatable assumptions
in Model 1 are relaxed. In this alternative model, ﬁnancial constraints are captured as collateral
constraints on the maximum amount of debt that ﬁrms can borrow.
9The Collateral Constraints
For tractability, we follow Hennessy and Whited (2005) and model only single-period debt. Let
bjt+1 represent the face value of one-period debt chosen by ﬁrm j at beginning of period t with
payment due at the beginning of period t+1. Positive values of bjt+1 imply that the ﬁrm is borrowing
and negative values of bjt+1 imply that the ﬁrm is saving or retaining earnings.
When borrowing, ﬁrms face collateral constraints which require that the liquidation value of
capital net of depreciation is at least as high as the promised debt payment:
bjt+1 ≤ s(1 − δ)kjt+1 (14)
where 0 < s < 1 is a constant parameter. Eﬀectively, we assume that in the event of liquidation,
capital can only be sold at a depressed price, s < 1. The portion (1−s) of capital is lost in the
liquidation process due to, for example, bankruptcy costs.
Because the collateral constraints guarantee that lenders always get repaid in full, all corporate
debts are riskless and their interest rates equal to the risk-free rate rft. Accordingly, by committing
to repay bjt+1 at the beginning of t+1, ﬁrm j obtains cash inﬂow bjt+1/rft at the beginning of
period t. For tractability, we do not model defaultable bonds.
Retained Earnings
Because of the collateral constraints, ﬁrms are not indiﬀerent between savings and cash distribu-
tions. If a ﬁrm distributes a dollar to the shareholders today, this dollar invested on the Treasury
bills will be worth rft next period. But the cost of distributing this dollar equals the cost of borrow-
ing this dollar, rft, plus the shadow price of an additional dollar of borrowing when the collateral
constraints are binding. Firms thus strictly prefer savings to distributions. If the interest rate
earned by corporate savings, denoted rst, equals the risk-free borrowing rate, rft, ﬁrms will save
all the free cash ﬂow and never distribute.
In practice, ﬁrms do distribute cash to shareholders because there are costs associated with
10holding cash. Graham (2000) report that cash retentions are tax-disadvantaged because tax rates
generally exceed tax rates on interest income for bondholders. To capture this eﬀect, we follow Hen-
nessy, Levy, and Whited (2005) and assume that the saving rate is strictly less than the borrowing
rate, i.e., rst<rft. Speciﬁcally:
rst = rft − κ (15)
where κ>0 is a constant wedge between borrowing and saving rates. Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
provide further justiﬁcation for rst < rft. Suppose the two interest rates are equal, then in the
economy with ﬁnancial frictions, ﬁrms would strictly prefer to reinvest proﬁts. Doing so would
generate an excessive supply of loanable funds and the subsequent reduction in the saving rate, rst.
For notational simplicity, let 1b
jt+1≡1{bjt+1≥0} be the indicator function that equals one if ﬁrm
j borrows new debt at time t and zero otherwise. Because bjt+1 is a choice variable, 1b
jt+1 is known
at the beginning of time t. Further, we let
ιjt ≡ 1b
jt+1rft + (1 − 1b
jt+1)rst (16)
denote the interest rate applicable to ﬁrm j from time t to time t+1, known at the beginning of time t.
Costly External Equity
When the sum of the investment costs, φ(ijt,kjt), and promised debt repayment, bjt, exceeds the
sum of internal funds, πjt, and cash inﬂows from issuing new debt, bjt+1/ιjt, the ﬁrm can raise new
equity capital, ejt, to compensate for the ﬁnancial slack:
ejt ≡ max
￿






Motivated by empirical evidence (e.g., Smith 1977, Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao 1996, and
Altinkilic and Hansen 2000), we assume that there are costs of issuing external equity. We specify










where λ0,λ1>0 and 1e
jt≡1{ejt>0} is the indicator function that equals one if ﬁrm j issues external
equity and zero otherwise. The ﬁrst term in the right hand side of equation (18) captures the ﬁxed
costs of issuing equity and the second term captures the convex, variable costs.
On the other hand, when the sum of investment costs and debt repayments is lower than the
sum of internal funds and cash inﬂows from new debt, ﬁrms distribute the diﬀerence back to share-
holders. We assume that ﬁrms do not incur any costs when distributing cash. We do not model
speciﬁc forms of the payout, cash dividends or open market share repurchases; the model only pins
down the total amount of payout.
Market Value of Equity, Risk, and Expected Returns
Deﬁne the eﬀective dividend accrued to the shareholders as:
ojt ≡ π(kjt,zjt,xt) +
bjt+1
ιjt
− φ(ijt,kjt) − bjt − λ(ejt,kjt) (19)
ojt can be negative because the new equity ejt from equation (17) can be positive.
Let v(kjt,bjt,zjt,xt) denote the market value of equity for ﬁrm j. Using Bellman’s Principle of
Optimality, we can formulate its dynamic value-maximization problem as:
v(kjt,bjt,zjt,xt) = max
{ijt,kjt+1,bjt+1}
{ojt + Et [mt+1v(kjt+1,bjt+1,zjt+1,xt+1)]} (20)
subject to the collateral-constraint equation (14) and the capital-accumulation equation (10).
The deﬁnition of risk and expected excess return in Model 2 is similar to that in Model 1. Eval-
uating the value function in equation (20) at the optimum yields vjt=ojt+Et [mt+1vjt+1] or equiv-
alently, 1=Et [mt+1rjt+1], where the stock return rjt+1≡vjt+1/(vjt − ojt). With rjt+1 deﬁned, ex-
pected excess returns and risk can be deﬁned in a similar way as equations (12) and (13) in Model 1.
12The Shadow Price of New Debt
Let νjt ≡ ν(kjt,bjt,zjt,xt) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral constraint in
equation (14), or the shadow price of new debt. The higher νjt is, the more ﬁnancially constrained







where λe(ejt,kjt) is the ﬁrst derivative of λ with respect to ejt when ejt>0.
The interpretation of equation (21) is straightforward. Because debt and equity are two sources
of external funds, the shadow price of new debt depends on the tradeoﬀ between debt and equity
ﬁnance. On the one hand, one additional unit of debt saves ﬁrm j an amount that equals the
marginal cost of equity ﬁnance, λe(ejt,kjt)1e
jt. This marginal beneﬁt of new debt must be dis-
counted by rft because the ﬁrm only raises 1/rft dollar at the beginning of time t by agreeing to
pay one additional unit of debt, bjt+1, at the beginning of period t+1. On the other hand, there are
costs associated with borrowing one additional unit of debt because it must be repaid. Having to
repay the debt at the beginning of period t+1 means that the ﬁrm must pay the marginal cost of
equity ﬁnance λe(ejt+1,kjt+1)1e
jt+1. This (stochastic) cost of borrowing must be discounted back
to the beginning of time t, as shown in the second term in equation (21).
3 Qualitative Analysis
Section 3.1 calibrates the model parameters and discusses brieﬂy the numerical issues involved in
solving the models. Section 3.2 and 3.3 then provide qualitative analysis on the solutions to Models
1 and 2, respectively. Appendix B details the numerical algorithms.
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate all model parameters at the monthly frequency to be consistent with the empirical
literature. Table 1 reports the parameters. Following Gomes (2001) and Zhang (2005), we set the
13capital share α to be 0.30 and the monthly rate of depreciation δ to be 0.01, which implies an annual
rate of 12%. The persistence of aggregate productivity process, ρx, is set to be 0.951/3=0.983, and
its conditional volatility, σx, 0.007/3=0.0023. With the ﬁrst-order autoregressive speciﬁcation for
xt in equation (2), these monthly values correspond to 0.95 and 0.007 at the quarterly frequency,
respectively, consistent with Cooley and Prescott (1995).
Following Zhang (2005), we pin down the three parameters governing the stochastic discount fac-
tor, η, γ0, and γ1 to match three aggregate return moments: the average Sharpe ratio; the average
real interest rate; and the volatility of real interest rate.4 This procedure yields η=0.994, γ0=50,
and γ1 = −1000, which generate an average Sharpe ratio of 0.41, an average annual real interest
rate of 2.2%, and an annual volatility of real interest rate of 2.9%, similar to those in the data.
The adjustment-cost parameters, aP and aN, can be interpreted as the periods required to
expanding and cutting the capital stock, respectively, given one unit of change in the marginal q.
We set aP = 15 and aN = 150 months, respectively, close to the average estimates in the empiri-
cal investment literature. To calibrate the persistence ρz and the conditional volatility σz for the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity in equation (3), we set ρz =0.96 and σz =0.10. These values are chosen
to obtain an average annual cross-sectional volatility of individual stock returns around 27%. The
ﬁxed cost of production f is set to be 0.0275.
There are also three parameters speciﬁc to Model 2, including the liquidation cost parameter s,
the ﬁxed ﬂoatation-cost parameter λ0, and the ﬂow ﬂoatation-cost parameter λ1. We let s=0.85
which implies proportional liquidation costs of 15%, largely consistent with available evidence. For
example, Altman (1984) estimates the average bankruptcy costs to be 12% of the ﬁrm value three
years prior to the petition date and 16.7% at the petition date. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) esti-
mate direct and indirect ﬁnancial distress costs to be between 10–20% of ﬁrms value. And Hennessy
and Whited (2006) estimate bankrupt costs to be 10.4% of the value of assets with a p-value of
4From equations (4) and (5), the real interest rate rft and the maximum Sharpe ratio St can be written












 m≡[γ0 + γ1(xt − ¯ x)](1 − ρx)(xt − ¯ x) and σm≡σx[γ0 + γ1(xt − ¯ x)].
146%. For the equity ﬁnancing costs, we calibrate the ﬁxed ﬂoatation cost λ0 to be 0.08 and the ﬂow
ﬂoatation cost λ1 to be 0.025. These parameter values are the same as those in Gomes (2001), who
estimate these parameters based on Smith (1977).
Armed with these parameter values, we use value function iteration techniques to solve the
models. It is worthwhile pointing out that solving the models, especially Model 2, is technically
challenging. (The solution algorithm for Model 2 coded in MATLAB takes about 30 days to run on
a Dell workstation with dual Xeon 2Ghz CPUs and 1.00 GB of RAM.) The reason is that Model 2
is subject to the “curse of dimensionality” (e.g., Judd 1998, p. 430). In an eﬀort to be reasonably
realistic, Model 2 has in total four state variables including capital stock kjt, current-period debt
bjt, ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt, and aggregate productivity xt. Further complicating the solution
algorithm are the two control variables, next-period capital kjt+1 and next-period debt bjt+1.
By way of contrast, Hennessy and Whited (2005) have two controls and three states, and Hen-
nessy and Whited (2006) have two controls and two states. More important, Hennessy and Whited
calibrate and solve their models in annual frequency, but our asset pricing applications require that
we calibrate and solve our models in monthly frequency. The high frequency lowers the speed of
convergence of our solution algorithm by an order of magnitude relative to their algorithm. Another
informative comparison is with Zhang (2005), who solves his model with four states in monthly
frequency, but he has only one control. Despite the curse of dimensionality, we opt to use the value
function iteration algorithm because of its well-known stability and precision.
3.2 Model 1: Qualitative Analysis
Using the numerical solution to Model 1, we plot and discuss the value and policy functions, risk
and expected excess returns, and the multiplier as functions of the underlying state variables.
Because there are three state variables in Model 1 (capital stock kjt, aggregate productivity xt,
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt), Panels A and C in Figures 1 and 2 plot the variables against kjt
and zjt, while ﬁxing xt at its long-run average level ¯ x. Each one of these panels has a set of curves
15corresponding to diﬀerent values of zjt, and the arrow in each panel indicates the direction along
which zjt increases. Panels B and D then plot the variables against kjt and xt only, while ﬁxing zjt
at its long run average level ¯ zj =0. Each one of these panels has a set of curves corresponding to
diﬀerent values of xt, and the arrow in each panel indicates the direction along which xt increases.
From Panels A and B in Figure 1, ﬁrms with relatively small capital stocks and high ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity have relatively high market-to-book ratios. These predictions are largely consistent
with the empirical evidence in Fama and French (1992, 1995). Moreover, ﬁrms have relatively high
market-to-book ratios when the general economic conditions are relatively good, consistent with
the evidence on time series predictability associated with aggregate book-to-market (e.g., Kothari
and Shanken 1997, Pontiﬀ and Schall 1999).
The optimal investment-to-capital ratio largely inherits the properties of the market-to-book
ratio. From Panels C and D in Figure 1, ﬁrms with relatively small capital stocks and ﬁrms with
relatively high ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁtability invest more relative to their capital stocks and grow faster,
consistent with the evidence in Fama and French (1995). Because investment-to-capital is indepen-
dent of capital stock with constant return to scale, the driving force behind our model-implied in-
verse relation between investment-to-capital and capital stock is therefore decreasing return to scale.
The Multiplier
The multiplier associated with the dividend nonnegativity constraint in equation (11) is at the cen-
ter of our analysis. Panel A of Figure 2 shows that the multiplier decreases in capital stock, kjt, and
in ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, zjt, suggesting that ﬁnancial constraints are more binding for small
and less proﬁtable ﬁrms. These patterns are intuitive and are consistent with the evidence (e.g.,
Chan and Chen 1991; Gertler and Gilchrist 1994; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann 2000; Lamont,
Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001); Whited and Wu 2006). Moreover, Panel B shows that the multiplier
increases in the aggregate productivity, xt, suggesting that ﬁnancial constraints are more binding
when the aggregate economic conditions are relatively good. Although somewhat surprising, this
16pattern is consistent with the evidence in Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006).
More important, why does the shadow price of new equity respond negatively to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shocks but positively to aggregate shocks? The crux is the stochastic discount factor, mt+1, modeled
in equation (4). Aggregate shocks aﬀect mt+1, but ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks do not.
Intuitively, the multiplier for a given ﬁrm is determined by the gap between its investment
demands and internal funds. The ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained if its investment demands exceed
internal funds. The higher the gap, the higher the shadow price of external funds, and the more
constrained the ﬁrm will be.
Productivity shocks have two oﬀsetting eﬀects on the ﬁnancial gap. A positive shock increases
internal funds and thereby reduces the gap, but it also increases investment demands and thereby
increases the gap. For ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates quantitatively, therefore ﬁrms
with higher ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity are less constrained.
The two oﬀsetting eﬀects also apply to aggregate shocks. Most important, aggregate shocks
diﬀer from ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks because aggregate shocks aﬀect the stochastic discount factor. Ag-
gregate shocks can therefore aﬀect investment demands through an additional, discount-rate chan-
nel. Speciﬁcally, when a positive aggregate shock hits a ﬁrm, it will increase investment demands
through the usual cash ﬂow channel because its capital stock becomes more productive. But a
positive aggregate shock also gives rise to a higher discount factor, mt+1, or loosely speaking, a
lower discount rate, 1/mt+1. This discount-rate eﬀect in turn increases the expected continuation
value, Et[mt+1v(kjt+1,zjt+1,xt+1)] in equation (9), stimulating investment demands even further.
The increase in investment demands dominates quantitatively the increase in internal funds from
the positive aggregate shock. Consequently, the ﬁnancial gap increases.
As a corollary, the discount-rate channel on the multiplier should disappear without the stochas-
tic discount factor. And the multiplier should be countercyclical when mt+1 is constant. This out-
come is indeed what happens in the model. Panels C and D in Figure 2 plot the multiplier against
underlying state variables in Model 1 with a constant discount factor, γ0=γ1=0. From Panel D,
17the multiplier now decreases in the aggregate productivity xt. Eﬀectively, with the constant dis-
count factor, aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks enter the value-maximization problem
of ﬁrms symmetrically. In the same way that ﬁrms with low ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity are more
constrained, ﬁrms are more constrained when aggregate economic conditions are relatively bad.5
Risk and Expected Excess Return
Figure 3 plots expected excess returns and risk, deﬁned in equations (12) and (13), respectively.
From Panels A and C, ﬁrms with small scale of production and low ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity are
riskier and earn higher expected returns than ﬁrms with large scale of production and high ﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity. More important, as shown in Panel A of Figure 2, small and less proﬁtable
ﬁrms are also most likely to be ﬁnancially constrained. Collectively, the panels show that more
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are riskier and earn higher expected returns than less ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrms. These predictions lend support to Chan and Chen (1991) and Perez-Quiros and
Timmermann (2000). These authors interpret their evidence as suggesting that small ﬁrms and
relatively unproﬁtable ﬁrms earn higher average returns because these ﬁrms are more adversely
aﬀected by lower liquidity in tight credit market conditions.
However, market value of equity and book-to-market are determined jointly and endogenously
with the multiplier by the underlying state variables in equilibrium. To quantify the incremental
eﬀects of the multiplier on risk and expected returns independent of size and book-to-market, we
must use computational experiments. We take up this task in Section 4.
Finally, Panels B and D in Figure 3 show that conditional betas, βjt, increase but expected ex-
cess returns decrease with the aggregate productivity, xt. These two eﬀects can be reconciled by the
countercyclical price of risk, ζmt, implied by the pricing kernel in equation (4). Although the amount
of risk is high in good times, the price of risk is low, giving rise to low expected excess returns.
5In a previous version of this paper, we also report that market-to-book and investment-to-capital in the constant-
discount-factor case are much less sensitive to aggregate shocks than their counterparts in the benchmark stochastic-
discount-factor case. These results are omitted for brevity but are available upon request.
183.3 Model 2: Qualitative Analysis
We now ask whether our central insights on the determinants of the multiplier, risk, and expected
returns from Model 1 are robust if we relax its restrictive assumptions. The answer is largely
aﬃrmative. To this end, we turn to Model 2 with collateral constraints.
Panels A and B of Figure 4 show that, in Model 2, the market-to-book ratio, vjt/kjt, is strictly
decreasing with the current-period debt, bjt. This result is expected because the Envelope Theo-
rem implies that vb(kjt,bjt,zjt,xt)= −(1 + λe(ejt,kjt)1e
jt)< 0. Further, this pattern is consistent
with the inverse relation between market-to-book and leverage ratios documented by, for example,
Smith and Watts (1992). From Panels C and D, ﬁrms with large amount of debt invest less than
ﬁrms with small amount of debt and ﬁrms with corporate liquidity, a pattern often called “debt
overhang” (e.g., Myers 1977; Hennessy 2004).6
Figure 5 reports the optimal next-period-debt-to-capital ratio, bjt+1/kjt, as functions of the
underlying state variables. Several intuitive patterns arise. First, ﬁrms with relatively small scale
of production, kjt, and low ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁtability, zjt, borrow more (Panel A). Second, ﬁrms also
borrow more in good times (Panel B). Third, the debt-to-capital ratio is persistent because ﬁrms
with more debt in the current period are likely to borrow more, and ﬁrms with more corporate
savings are likely to save more (Panels C and D). Fourth, given capital stock, more proﬁtable ﬁrms
save more and borrow less (Panels A and C). Finally, depending on their current debt levels, ﬁrms
tend to save more and borrow more in economic booms (Panel D). Although optimal debt policy
is not the focus of our study, we notice that these predictions are largely consistent with empirical
evidence on debt (e.g., Titman and Wessels 1988; Smith and Watts 1992; Rajan and Zingales 1995).
The Multiplier
The properties of the multiplier in Model 2 are largely similar to those in Model 1. From Panels
A and B of Figure 6, the shadow price of new debt, νjt, is decreasing with capital stock, kjt, and
6We also ﬁnd that, in Model 2, both market-to-book and investment-to-capital are decreasing and convex in
capital stock, and are both increasing in aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. These results are similar to those
from Model 1, and are omitted to avoid redundancy with Figure 1. Details are available upon request.
19weakly decreasing ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, zjt. Panels B and D show that the multiplier νjt is
weakly increasing in aggregate productivity xt, suggesting that ﬁrms are again more constrained
in good times. From Panels C and D, ﬁrms with positive corporate liquidity (and low current debt
levels) are unconstrained ﬁnancially, and ﬁrms with high current debt levels are more constrained.
Moreover, the behavior of new-equity-to-capital, ejt/kjt, is very similar to that of the multiplier.
Firms with small capital stock and large debt overhang issue more equity, but the new equity is
much less sensitive to either aggregate or ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks.7
More important, although the multipliers from Models 1 and 2 share similar properties, compar-
ing Figures 2 and 6 shows that the multiplier in Model 2 appears much less sensitive quantitatively
to changes in aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks. This pattern is noteworthy because,
as shown in Table 1, 12 out of 16 parameters in Model 2 are directly from Model 1. The remaining
four parameters are speciﬁc to the structure in Model 2. The diﬀerences in quantitative magnitude
are therefore more likely to be driven by structural diﬀerences, not diﬀerent parameters across the
models. Intuitively, the collateral constraints in Model 2 restrict only debt ﬁnancing; ﬁrms can still
ﬁnance investments with new equity. In contrast, the dividend nonnegativity constraints in Model 1
are much more restrictive, eﬀectively ruling out all new funds, debt or equity. It is therefore natural
that the multiplier from Model 1 is more sensitive to shocks than the multiplier from Model 2.
Debt, Liquidity, Risk, and Expected Excess Returns
In Model 2, the structural relations between risk and expected excess returns on the one side, and
capital stock and productivity shocks on the other, are similar to those in Model 1. Speciﬁcally,
ﬁrms with small capital stocks and low ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity are riskier and earn higher ex-
pected excess returns than ﬁrms with large capital stocks and high ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity.8 As
shown in Figure 6, small and less proﬁtable ﬁrms in Model 2 are also more constrained ﬁnancially.
Therefore, as in Model 1, Model 2 also predicts that more constrained ﬁrms are riskier and earn
7The details are omitted to avoid redundancy with Figure 6, but are available upon request.
8The details are omitted to avoid redundancy with Figure 3, but are available upon request.
20higher expected returns than less constrained ﬁrms.
More interesting, Model 2 allows us to study how current-period debt, bjt, aﬀects risk and
expected returns. From all panels in Figure 7, all else equal, ﬁrms with high current debt are riskier
and earn higher expected returns than ﬁrms with low current debt and ﬁrms with corporate savings.
The positive relation between current debt and risk and expected returns is even more dramatic for
less proﬁtable ﬁrms (Panels A and C). Further, because Figure 6 shows that ﬁrms with high current
debt and low proﬁtability are more constrained ﬁnancially, Figure 7 reinforces our conclusion that
more constrained ﬁrms are riskier and earn higher expected returns than less constrained ﬁrms.
4 Quantitative Implications
We now study quantitative implications of our models. We continue to focus on two key issues, the
relation between ﬁnancial constraints and stock returns and the cyclicality of ﬁnancial constraints.
Our experiment design follows that of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Berk, Green, and Naik
(1999). We simulate 100 artiﬁcial panels, each of which has 3000 ﬁrms and 480 months. The sample
size is similar to that used in empirical studies based on the CRSP-COMPUSTATE merged dataset.
We implement a variety of empirical procedures on each artiﬁcial panel and report the across-
simulation averaged results. Whenever possible, we compare model moments with those in the data.
4.1 Financial Constraints and Stock Returns
We ﬁrst look at the quantitative relations between the multipliers and average returns. Using the
Fama and French (1993) portfolio approach, we construct portfolios by sorting on the multipliers,
with and without controlling for size and book-to-market. Because the multipliers are the pre-
cise measures of ﬁnancial constraints in our models, our results can help interpret the evidence in
Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001) and Whited and Wu (2006).
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Table 2 reports the average monthly stock returns for ten portfolios sorted annually on the mul-
tipliers in simulated panels. Besides Models 1 and 2 reported in Panels A and B, we also report
results from two alternative calibrations of Model 2. Panel C considers the high-liquidation-cost
case for Model 2, in which the liquidation value per unit of capital, s, is reset to be 0.70, lower
than its benchmark calibration of 0.85. We consider this case because Hennessy and Whited (2005)
estimate the parameter s to be 0.59, albeit with a high p-value of 0.35. Panel D considers the
low-ﬁxed-ﬂoatation-cost case for Model 2, in which the ﬁxed ﬂoatation cost parameter, λ0, is reset
to be 0.02. Between the benchmark and the two alternative cases of Model 2, we cover a broad
range of empirically plausible parameter values for s and λ0.9
From Panel A of Table 2, the one-way sort on the multiplier,  jt, in Model 1 generates a
positive relation between the multiplier and average returns. The average value-weighted return
increases monotonically from 0.65% per month for the low-multiplier (least constrained) portfolio
to 1.24% per month for the high-multiplier (most constrained) portfolio. And the average-return
diﬀerence between the two extreme deciles is 0.59% with a signiﬁcant t-statistic of 5.11. Using
equally-weighted returns yields a similar return spread of 0.57 (t-statistic = 5.13).
As shown in Panel B of Table 2, sorting on the multiplier, νjt, from Model 2 also produces a
positive, monotonic relation between the multiplier and average returns. However, the average-
return spread between the two extremes is only 0.30% per month (t-statistic = 4.42) in the
benchmark case of Model 2, only about one half of the return spread in Model 1. This quantitative
result is consistent with our earlier observation that the multiplier is less sensitive to shocks in Model
2 than that in Model 1. The reason is that ﬁrms in Model 2 have multiple sources of external ﬁnance,
and are more ﬂexible ﬁnancially than ﬁrms in Model 1. Finally, from Panels C and D, raising the
liquidation-cost parameter and lowering the ﬁxed-ﬂoatation-cost parameter both serve to increase
9We have also tried comparative statics for the cases with symmetric adjustment cost, aP = aN = 15, low ﬁxed
cost of production, f =0.025, high ﬁxed cost of production, f =0.030, low conditional volatility of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock,
σz=0.075, and high conditional volatility of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock, σz =0.125. Our results are basically unchanged.
22somewhat the average-return spread between the most-constrained and the least-constrained
portfolios. And our basic conclusion regarding the positive multiplier-return relation is unchanged.
Controlling for Size and Book-to-Market
Using their respective measures of ﬁnancial constraints, Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001)
and Whited and Wu (2006) document that, after controlling for market capitalization, the average-
return spread between the most constrained and the least constrained ﬁrms is statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. We now ask whether our models are consistent with this ﬁnding.
Speciﬁcally, we conduct on artiﬁcial panels two-way sorts on the multiplier— jt from Model 1
and νjt from Model 2—and the market capitalization, measured as the ex-dividend market value
of equity—vjt−djt in Model 1 and vjt−ojt in Model 2. Following Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo
(2001) and Whited and Wu (2006), we deﬁne small-cap ﬁrms (S), mid-cap ﬁrms (M), and large-cap
ﬁrms (L) as ﬁrms in the bottom 40%, the middle 20%, and the top 40% of the sample sorted on the
market capitalization, respectively. Similarly, low-, middle-, and high-multiplier portfolios contain
ﬁrms in the bottom 40% (L), the middle 20% (M), and the top 40% (H) of the sample sorted on
the multiplier, respectively. We then deﬁne the average high-multiplier portfolio as HIGHFC =
(BH + MH + SH)/3, and the average low-multiplier portfolio as LOWFC = (BL + ML + SL)/3,
and the ﬁnancial constraints factor as FC = HIGHFC − LOWFC.
Table 3 reports the model-implied average returns of the two-way sorted portfolios in excess of
the risk-free rate, rft, and compares the model moments with the data moments. From the last two
columns of the table, Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001) and Whited and Wu (2006) estimate
the average return of FC to be −0.13% per month (t-statistic = −1.17) and 0.18% (t-statistic =
0.95), respectively. (The t-statistic for the average FC-return from Lamont et al. is calculated by
the authors based on the information reported in their Table 5.) The average FC return in Model
1 is 0.42% per month (t-statistic = 2.05). And Model 2 appears to do a better job in matching
the data moments; its implied average FC return is 0.19% (t-statistic = 0.76) in the benchmark
23parametrization. Changing the liquidation-cost parameter and the ﬁxed-ﬂoatation-cost parameter
does not materially aﬀect our quantitative results on the ﬁnancial constraints factor.
A natural question arises: Why does the relation between ﬁnancial constraints and average
returns appear signiﬁcant in the one-way sort but largely insigniﬁcant in the two-way sort? The
reason is that risk and expected returns are determined jointly with other endogenous variables
such as size, book-to-market, and the multipliers by the underlying state variables. In Model 1,
ﬁrms diﬀer in capital stock kjt and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt. In Model 2, ﬁrms also diﬀer in
current debt, bjt. The cross section of risk and expected returns is ultimately determined by these
ﬁrm-speciﬁc state variables, and the cross section also varies over time, depending on aggregate
productivity, xt (see Figures 3 and 7). The multipliers are correlated with risk and expected returns
because they contain information about the state variables that determine risk and expected re-
turns. More important, the information in the multipliers is not all independent of the information
in size and book-to-market because of their joint determination.
Table 4 shows that size and book-to-market in our models largely subsume the eﬀects of ﬁ-
nancial constraints on risk and expected returns. Using simulated data, the table reports the
Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regressions of stock returns, rjt+1, from the begin-
ning of time t to the beginning of time t+1, onto the multiplier, size, and book-to-market equity, all
measured at the beginning of time t. Size is measured as the logarithm of the market value of equity,
and book-to-market equity is measured as ln[kjt/(vjt−djt)] in Model 1 and ln[(kjt−bjt)/(vjt−ojt)]
in Model 2. The tables reports that the slopes of the multipliers are all positive and signiﬁcant in
univariate regressions, but become insigniﬁcant and even slightly negative in multiple regressions
once we control for size and book-to-market equity.
4.2 Financial Constraints, Firm Characteristics, and Business Cycles
Because the shadow price of new funds is unobservable in the data, researchers are forced to use
observable ﬁrm characteristics to serve as proxies for ﬁnancial constraints. In the model simula-
24tions, however, we can calculate the Lagrange multipliers associated with ﬁnancial constraints as
precise measures of the shadow prices of new funds. It is therefore interesting to ask, using our
theoretical models as natural laboratories, how well the characteristics commonly used in practice
can proxy for ﬁnancial constraints. The answer is fairly positive.
The ﬁrst set of characteristics we study is motivated from Whited and Wu (2006), who use
cash ﬂow to assets (CFjt, measured as πjt/kjt in both models); debt to assets (TLTDjt, measured
as bjt1b
jt/kjt in Model 2, undeﬁned in Model 1); the logarithm of assets (LNTAjt, measured as
log(kjt)); sales growth (SGjt, measured as yjt/yjt−1); and a dividend dummy (DIV POSjt, which
takes the value of one if djt >0 in Model 1 and if ojt >0 in Model 2). Whited and Wu estimate
the Lagrange multiplier on a dividend nonnegativity constraint in a framework similar to Model 1,
and deﬁne the estimated multiplier as the Whited-Wu (WW) index of ﬁnancial constraints:10
WWjt = −0.091CFjt − 0.062DIV POSjt + 0.021TLTDjt − 0.044LNTAjt − 0.035SGjt (22)
Panel A of Table 5 reports Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of the Lagrange
multipliers onto contemporaneous ﬁrm characteristics motivated from Whited and Wu (2006). Con-
sistent with their evidence, our simulations show that ﬁrms are more constrained ﬁnancially if they
have lower ratios of cash ﬂow to assets, higher ratios of debt to assets, lower sales, lower contem-
poraneous sales growth, and zero rather than positive dividend payments. Moreover, the slope
coeﬃcients of these characteristics are reasonably close to those reported in the data.
We also consider a set of ﬁrm characteristics used by Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001)
to proxy for ﬁnancial constraints, characteristics in turn motivated from Kaplan and Zingales
(1997). The list includes cash ﬂow to assets (CFjt), debt to assets (TLTDjt), dividends to assets
(TDIVjt, measured as djt/kjt in Model 1, and ojt(1 − 1e
jt)/kjt in Model 2), liquid assets or cash to
10Whited and Wu (2006) also use industry sales growth in their ﬁnancial constraints index. We do not use this
variable in our simulations because our one-sector models provide no cross-sectional variations in industry sales
growth. If we include this term in the estimation, it will simply be absorbed into the intercept term. Our models
can equivalently be interpreted as multi-sector models by treating ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks as industry shocks. But then
industry sales growth coincides with ﬁrm-level sales growth, SGjt.
25assets, (CASHjt, measured as −bjt(1 − 1b
jt)/kjt in Model 2, undeﬁned in Model 1), and Tobin’s Q
measured as (vjt − djt)/kjt in Model 1 and (vjt − ojt + bjt)/kjt in Model 2. Kaplan and Zingales
classify ﬁrms on a scale from one to four on ﬁnancial constraints, and perform an ordered logit of
the scale onto the above characteristics. Lamont et al. then use these logit coeﬃcients to construct
an index of ﬁnancial constraints, called the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index, as:
KZjt = −1.002CFjt + 3.139TLTDjt − 39.368TDIVjt − 1.315CASHjt + 0.283Qjt (23)
Panel B of Table 5 reports Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of the multipliers
onto contemporaneous ﬁrm characteristics motivated from Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Consistent
with their evidence, our simulations show that ﬁrms are more constrained ﬁnancially if they have
lower cash ﬂow relative to assets, higher debt relative to assets, lower ratios of dividends to assets,
lower liquid assets or cash relative to total assets, and higher Tobin’s Q. It is tempting to compare
quantitatively the slopes from the models to those reported in Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo
(2001). However, doing so is inappropriate because the slopes in the data are from ordered logit
regressions. We opt to use more precise OLS regressions in simulations because we can calculate
precisely the multipliers using simulated data.
More interesting, armed with the eﬀectively observable multipliers in model simulations, we can
use Model 2 as a laboratory to evaluate the relative quality of the KZ index and the WW index as
measures of ﬁnancial constraints. Model 1 is unﬁt for this task because debt to assets and cash to
assets are not deﬁned in that model. Speciﬁcally, we perform Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional
regressions of the multiplier, νjt, onto the indexes, KZjt and WWjt, both separately and jointly.
And we use the relative magnitudes of the slopes and the average cross-sectional R2s as measures of
relative quality for the indexes. To make the magnitudes of their slopes comparable, we standardize
both indexes by dividing their demeaned values with their respective standard deviations before
using them in the cross-sectional regressions.
From Table 6, both the KZ index and the WW index are positively correlated with the true
26multiplier. More important, the WW index appears to do a much better job than the KZ index
as a proxy for the multiplier. From Panel A, in Model 2 with the benchmark parametrization, the
average cross-sectional R2 from regressing the multiplier onto the WW index alone is 33.10%, almost
three times higher than the R2 from using the KZ index as the regressor, which is only 12.87%.
The slope of the WW index in the joint regression with both indexes is 0.0576, more than eight
times of the magnitude for the KZ slope, 0.0070. The two alternative parameterizations of Model 2
yield quantitatively similar, if not stronger, results. In the joint regression in Panel C with low ﬁxed
ﬂoatation costs, the slope of the WW index is 0.15 with a signiﬁcant t-statistic of 6.94. In contrast,
the slope of the KZ index is now negative, −0.0161, albeit insigniﬁcant. To sum up, the KZ index
largely looses its explanatory power for ﬁnancial constraints in the presence of the WW index.
Finally, there also exists some evidence on the cyclical properties of ﬁnancial constraints. Using
data on cross-sectional returns, Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006) report that the shadow price of
new equity is procyclical. In untabulated results, we ﬁnd that the population, time-series correla-
tions between the multiplier averaged across ﬁrms and aggregate productivity are 0.63 in Model 1,
0.60 in the benchmark parametrization of Model 2, and 0.59 and 0.69 in the high-liquidation-cost
and low-ﬁxed-ﬂoatation-cost cases of Model 2, respectively. These quantitative results are con-
sistent with our earlier analysis based on Figures 2 and 6. Replacing aggregate productivity by




j=1 kjt in simulations, lowers the corre-
sponding correlations to 0.39, 0.36, 0.31, and 0.31, respectively. The correlations are lower because
the aggregate investment-to-capital is an imperfect proxy for aggregate productivity. Our models
thus provide a microfoundation for the interpretation in Gomes et al. that ﬁnancial constraints are
more binding when aggregate economic conditions are relatively good.
5 Conclusion
We construct two dynamic, neoclassical models to study the structural relations between ﬁnancial
constraints, stock returns, and business cycles. In Model 1, ﬁrms face dividend nonnegativity con-
27straints in a simple setting without debt or retained earnings. Model 2 is more realistic because
ﬁrms can retained earnings, raise debt and equity, and face collateral constraints on debt capacity.
The models predict that small ﬁrms, less proﬁtable ﬁrms, and ﬁrms in debt are more likely to be
ﬁnancially constrained. These ﬁrms are also riskier and earn higher expected returns, although
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on risk and expected returns can largely be subsumed quantita-
tively by market capitalization and book-to-market equity. Finally, because the stochastic discount
factor makes capital investment more sensitive to aggregate shocks, ﬁnancial constraints are more
important when aggregate economic conditions are relatively good.
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32A Derivations of the Lagrange Multipliers
To derive equation (11), we combine the dividend nonnegativity constraint in equation (8) with the
value function in equation (9). The resultant Lagrangian formulation of the value function, when
evaluated at optimum, can be written as:
v(kjt,zjt,xt) = (1 +  jt)d(kjt,ijt,zjt,xt) + Et [mt+1v(kjt+1,zjt+1,xt+1)]
Since d(kjt,ijt,zjt,xt) is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to kjt, v(kjt,zjt,xt) is also diﬀer-
entiable with respect to kjt (see, for example, Theorem 9.10 in Stokey and Lucas with Prescott
1989). Equation (11) follows by diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to kjt and using the Envelope
Theorem (see, for example, Theorem M.L.1 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995).
To characterize the multiplier given in equation (21) for Model 2, we ﬁrst write down the
inﬁnite-horizon, Lagrangian formulation of the value function, denoted L, as follows:
Ljt =     + π(kjt,zjt,xt) +
bjt+1
ιjt








− φ(ijt+1,kjt+1) − bjt+1 − λ(ejt+1,kjt+1) − νjt+1(bjt+2 − s(1 − δ)kjt+2) +    
￿￿
Note that Ljt is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere except when π(kjt,zjt,xt)+bjt+1/ιjt−φ(ijt,kjt)−
bjt=0. Thus, we can characterize νjt analytically only in the case when ejt is strictly positive.
When ejt>0, diﬀerentiating Ljt with respect to bjt+1 and recognizing













jt − νjt − Et[mt+1(1 + λe(ejt+1,kjt+1)1e
jt+1)] = 0





jt] − Et[mt+1(1 + λe(ejt+1,kjt+1)1e
jt+1)] (A1)
We can simplify equation (A1) further by noting that the collateral constraint binds (νjt>0) when








We use the discrete-state value function iteration technique to solve the dynamic value-
maximization problems of ﬁrms in both Models 1 and 2. Piecewise linear interpolation is used
extensively to obtain ﬁrm value and policy functions which do not lie directly on the grid points.
The Matlab programs used to solve the dynamic programming problems and the C++ programs
used to simulate the models in this paper are available upon request.
33B.1 Model 1: Dividend Nonnegativity Constraints
For Model 1, the value function and the optimal investment policy are solved on a grid in a discrete
state space. We specify a grid with 50 points for the capital stock with an upper bound k (large
enough to be nonbinding at all times). Following McGrattan (1999), we construct the grid for
capital stock recursively, i.e., ki=ki−1 +ck1 exp(ck2 (i − 2)), where i=1,...,50 is the index of grid
points, and ck1 and ck2 are two constants chosen to provide the desired number of grid points and
k, given a pre-speciﬁed lower bound k. The advantage of this recursive construction is that more
grid points are assigned around k, where the value function has most of its curvature.
The state variables x and z are deﬁned on continuous state spaces that can be transformed into
discrete state spaces using the Rouwenhorst (1995) methods. We use three grid points for the x
process and ﬁve points for the z process. In all cases our results are robust to ﬁner grids. Once the
discrete state space is available, the conditional expectation operator can be carried out as a matrix
multiplication. The expected return Et[rjt+1]=Et[vjt+1]/(vjt−djt) can be calculated in a similar
way. Piecewise linear interpolation is used extensively to obtain ﬁrm value, optimal investment, and
expected return, which do not lie directly on the grid points. Finally, to solve for the Lagrange multi-
plier on the grid according to equation (11), we use numerical diﬀerentiation to calculate the ﬁrst or-
der derivative vk with quadratic accuracy (e.g., Judd 1998, p.281). dk can be calculated analytically.
B.2 Model 2: Collateral Constraints
Model 2 is substantially more challenging to solve than Model 1.
The capital stock in each period is constrained to be an element of the linear ﬁnite time-invariant
set K = {k1,...,kNK}, with total of NK = 50 elements (grid points). For any optimal capital stock
on the grid, the ﬁner grid used for the interpolation consists of 1000 evenly spaced points. The
face value of one-period debt, b, in each period is constrained to be an element of the linear ﬁnite
time-invariant set B = {b1,...,bNB}, centered around zero with total of NB = 2NK + 1 = 101
elements (grid points). The boundaries of the set, {b1,bNB} are the same for any ki ∈ K are chosen
to satisfy a weaker form of the collateral constraints:
{b1,bNB} = ±s(1 − δ)kNK
For any optimal debt on the grid chosen from a ﬁrst-pass optimization, the ﬁner grid used for
the interpolation consists of 1001 evenly spaced points. The state variables x ∈ X and z ∈ Z are
deﬁned on continuous state spaces. We again transform the state spaces into discrete ones using the
Rouwenhorst (1995) methods. We use nine points for the z process and ﬁve points for the x process.












where e v incorporates the collateral constraint as follows:
e vn = vn1{b′≤s(1−δ)k′} − 1010(1 − 1{b′≤s(1−δ)k′})
34and n indicates the number of value iterations. vn : K × B × X × Z is a list of 227,250 values as
compared to 8,250 values used for Model 1.
The algorithm can be described as follows:
• Make a guess for vn−1(k,b,z,x) on the right hand side of (A3). It will be an 25 × 51 × 9 × 5
object.
• For each {k,b,z,x} ∈ K × B × X × Z point use local linear interpolation to construct
vn−1(k′,b′,z,x). In Matlab, reshape the vn−1 into a traditional K × B matrix and again
reshape after the interpolation to form a three-dimensional object vn−1(k′,b′,z,x). Since
K × B is not a square matrix, it requires to perform interpolation along each dimension
separately. The order is not important.
• On the K′ × B′grid construct 1{b′≤s(1−δ)k′} which is a three-dimensional object of zeros and
ones and use it to construct e vn−1(k′,b′,z,x).














by doing a simple grid search along k′ holding b′ ﬁxed and then along b′ for each k∗.
• Construct vn(k,b,z,x) from equation (A3).
• Check for conversion using maximum error algorithm
max
￿ ￿vn(k,b,z,x) − vn−1(k,b,z,x)
￿ ￿ < ǫ = 10−5.
• If the conversion criteria is not satisﬁed set vn(k,b,z,x) as a new guess and repeat all of the
above steps.
35Table 1 : Benchmark Parameter Values
This table lists the benchmark parameter values used to solve and simulate Model 1 with the dividend nonnegativity constraints and Model 2 with the collateral
constraints. Panel A reports the parameters common to both models, and Panel B reports the parameters speciﬁc to Model 2.
Notation Parameter Value Description
Panel A: Parameters Common to Both Models 1 and 2
α 0.30 Capital share in production
δ 0.01 Monthly rate of capital depreciation
ρx 0.95
1/3 Persistence coeﬃcient of aggregate productivity
σx 0.007/3 Conditional volatility of aggregate productivity
η 0.994 Time-preference coeﬃcient
γ0 50 Constant price of risk parameter
γ1 −1000 Time-varying price of risk parameter
aP 15 Adjustment-cost parameter when investment is positive
aN 150 Adjustment-cost parameter when investment is negative
ρz 0.96 Persistence coeﬃcient of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity
σz 0.10 Conditional volatility of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity
f 0.0275 Fixed cost of production
Panel B: Parameters Speciﬁc to Model 2
s 0.85 Liquation value per unit of capital net of bankruptcy cost
λ0 0.08 Fixed ﬂoatation cost parameter
λ1 0.025 Proportional ﬂoatation cost parameter
κ 0.50%/12 Monthly wedge between the borrowing and saving rates of interest
3
6Table 2 : Monthly Stock Returns of Portfolios Based on One-Way Sorts on the Multiplier in Model Simulations
This table reports descriptive statistics for ten value-weighted and ten equal-weighted portfolios from one-way sorts on the Lagrange multiplier from Models 1 and
2. We report average returns in percent per month for each portfolio as well as the average high-minus-low portfolios and its t-statistics. We sort all ﬁrms based
on their Lagrange multipliers at the beginning of each year and then hold the portfolios for the whole year. For each model, we simulate 100 artiﬁcial panels,
each of which has 3000 ﬁrms and 480 monthly observations, and we then report the across-simulation averaged results. Panel A reports the quantitative results
from Model 1, in which all ﬁrms face the dividend nonnegativity constraints without corporate saving and borrowing. Panel B reports the results from Model
2, in which all ﬁrms can save but face the collateral constraints on borrowing. And Panel B reports the simulation results from Model 2 using the benchmark
parameters reported in Table 1. Panel C reports the simulation results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters except that the liquidation value per unit
of capital net of liquidation costs, s, is set to be 0.70. Finally, Panel D reports the simulation results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters except that
the ﬁxed cost of equity ﬁnancing, λ0, is set to be 0.02.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High FC tFC
Panel A: Model 1
Value-weighted 0.65 0.68 0.72 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.98 1.24 0.59 (5.11)
Equally-weighted 0.61 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.93 1.18 0.57 (5.13)
Panel B: Model 2 (the Benchmark Parametrization)
Value-weighted 0.54 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.84 0.30 (4.42)
Equally-weighted 0.42 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.73 0.31 (3.76)
Panel C: Model 2 (High Liquidation Cost, s = 0.70)
Value-weighted 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.71 0.38 (4.87)
Equally-weighted 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.62 0.35 (4.08)
Panel D: Model 2 (Low Floatation Cost, λ0 = 0.02)
Value-weighted 0.50 0.60 0.64 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.89 1.03 0.53 (5.44)
Equally-weighted 0.38 0.47 0.52 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.68 0.71 0.77 0.91 0.53 (4.87)
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7Table 3 : Average Monthly Percentage Returns for Portfolios Sorted on the Multiplier and Market Capitalization in Model
Simulations
This table reports average returns in monthly percent for nine value-weighted portfolios sorted on the market capitalization and the Lagrange multiplier in model
simulations. The rankings are performed annually and independently such that each portfolio contains ﬁrms both in a given size category and a given ﬁnancial
constraints category. Following Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001) and Whited and Wu (2006), we deﬁne small-cap ﬁrms (S) as ﬁrms that are in the bottom
40% of the sample sorted on market capitalization, mid-cap ﬁrms (M) are ﬁrms in the middle 20% of the sample, and large-cap ﬁrms (B) are ﬁrms in the top 40%
of the sample. Similarly, low-, middle-, and high-multiplier are ﬁrms in the bottom 40% (L), the middle 20% (M), and the top 40% (H) of the sample sorted on
the multiplier, respectively. We also deﬁne the average high-FC portfolio as HIGHFC = (BH + MH + SH)/3, and the average low-FC portfolio as LOWFC =
(BL + ML + SL)/3, and the ﬁnancial constraints factor as FC = HIGHFC − LOWFC. For each model, we simulate 100 artiﬁcial panels, each of which has 3000
ﬁrms and 480 monthly observations, and we then report the across-simulation averaged results. The third column reports the quantitative results from Model
1, in which all ﬁrms face the dividend nonnegativity constraints. The fourth column reports the results from Model 2, in which all ﬁrms can save but face the
collateral constraints on borrowing. This column reports the simulation results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters reported in Table 1. The ﬁfth
column reports the simulation results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters except that the liquidation value per unit of capital net of liquidation costs,
s, is set to be 0.70. And the sixth column reports the simulation results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters except that the ﬁxed ﬂoatation cost of
equity, λ0, is set to be 0.02. The last two columns report those from Table I of Lamont et al. and from Table 4 of Whited and Wu (2006).
Category Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Lamont et al. Whited and Wu
(Benchmark) (s = 0.70) (λ0 = 0.02) (2001) (2005)
Small-cap ﬁrms
Low FC SL 1.32 0.81 0.12 0.86 0.45 0.89
Middle FC SM 1.62 0.85 0.32 0.95 0.67 0.66
High FC SH 2.40 0.91 0.55 1.05 0.38 0.83
Mid-cap ﬁrms
Low FC ML 1.03 0.69 0.07 0.70 0.37 0.65
Middle FC MM 1.27 0.70 0.19 0.73 0.56 0.81
High FC MH 0.97 0.72 0.09 0.79 0.26 0.74
Large-cap ﬁrms
Low FC BL 0.86 0.35 0.04 0.50 0.47 0.71
Middle FC BM 0.89 0.56 0.06 0.56 0.53 0.96
High FC BH 1.11 0.79 0.10 0.63 0.25 1.23
HIGHFC 1.49 0.81 0.25 0.82 0.30 0.93
LOWFC 1.07 0.62 0.08 0.69 0.43 0.75
FC 0.42 0.19 0.17 0.13 −0.13 0.18
t-statistics of FC (2.05) (0.76) (0.81) (0.50) (−1.17) (0.95)
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8Table 4 : Fama-MacBeth (1973) Monthly Cross-Sectional Regressions of Percentage Stock Returns onto Lagrange Multiplier,
Size, and Book-to-Market in Model Simulations
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regressions of stock returns, rjt+1, onto the Lagrange multiplier, size, and book-to-market,
all measured at the beginning of month t.  jt denotes the multiplier in Model 1, and νjt denotes the multiplier in Model 2. ln(ME) is the logarithm of the
total market value of equity, measured as ln(vjt − djt) in Model 1 and ln(vjt − ojt) in Model 2. ln(BE/ME) is the logarithm of the book-to-market equity ratio,
measured as ln(kjt/(vjt −djt)) in Model 1 and ln((kjt−bjt)/(vjt−ojt)) in Model 2. For each model, we simulate 100 artiﬁcial panels, each of which has 3000 ﬁrms
and 480 monthly observations, and then report the across-simulation averaged Fama-MacBeth slopes and t-statistics. Panel A reports the quantitative results
from Model 1, in which all ﬁrms face the dividend nonnegativity constraints without corporate saving and borrowing. Panel B reports the results from Model 2,
in which all ﬁrms can save but face the collateral constraints on borrowing. Panel B reports the simulation results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters
reported in Table 1. Panel C reports the simulation results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters except that the liquidation value per unit of capital
net of liquidation costs, s, is set to be 0.70. Finally, Panel D reports the simulation results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters except that the ﬁxed
ﬂoatation cost, λ0, is set to be 0.02.
Panel A: Model 1 Panel B: Model 2 (The Benchmark Parametrization)
 jt ln(ME) ln(BE/ME) νjt ln(ME) ln(BE/ME)
1.39 6.23
(2.98) (2.79)
0.99 −15.93 12.78 2.60 −2.99 0.42
(1.81) (−2.46) (2.53) (0.65) (−2.51) (2.60)
Panel C: Model 2 (High Liquidation Cost, s = 0.70) Panel D: Model 2 (Low Fixed Floatation Cost, λ0 = 0.02)
νjt ln(ME) ln(BM) νjt ln(ME) ln(BM)
2.56 5.15
(2.83) (3.22)
1.20 −1.54 0.76 −0.11 −3.10 0.24
(1.16) (−2.21) (1.92) (−0.14) (−2.36) (1.61)
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9Table 5 : Cross-Sectional Determinants of the Lagrange Multipliers in Model Simulations
This table reports Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regressions of the multipliers. Panel A reports the regression similar to that reported in column
4 of Table I in Whited and Wu (2006):  jt (or νjt)=b0 + b1CF jt + b2TLTDjt + b3LNTAjt + b4SGjt + b5 DIV POSjt + ǫjt, where  jt is the multiplier in Model
(Mod) 1 and νjt is the multiplier in Model 2 for ﬁrm j during month t. CFjt is the cash ﬂow-to-asset ratio, TLTDjt is the total debt-to-assets ratio, LNTAjt
is the logarithm of the total assets, SGjt is the ﬁrm-level sales growth, and DIV POSjt is a dummy variable that equals one if ﬁrm j has paid dividends during
month t, and equals zero otherwise. Panel B reports the regression similar to that reported in Table 9 in Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001), the regression
which is in turn based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997):  jt (or νjt)=b0 + b1CF jt + b2TLTDjt + b3TDIV jt + b4CASHjt + b5Qjt + ǫjt, where CFjt is the cash
ﬂow-to-asset ratio, TLTDjt is the total debt-to-assets ratio, TDIVjt is the dividend-to-assets ratio, CASHjt is the ratio of total amount of liquid assets or cash
divided by assets, and Qjt is Tobin’s Q. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. We report quantitative results for Model 1, in which all ﬁrms face the dividend
nonnegativity constraints, and three parameterizations of Model 2, in which all ﬁrms can save but face the collateral constraints on borrowing. These three cases
include the benchmark parametrization reported in Table 1; the high-liquidation-cost case with the liquidation value per unit of capital net of liquidation costs,
s, being 0.70; and the low ﬁxed-ﬂoatation-cost case with the ﬁxed ﬂoatation cost of equity, λ0, being 0.02. For each case, we simulate 100 artiﬁcial panels, each of
which has 3000 ﬁrms and 480 months, and we then report the across-simulation averaged results. We also compare our simulated results to those from Lamont
et al. and Whited and Wu (reported in the “Data” column).
Panel A:  jt (or νjt)=b0 + b1CF jt + b2TLTDjt + b3LNTAjt + b4SGjt + b5 DIV POSjt + ǫjt, motivated from Whited and Wu (2006)
Cash Flow/Assets, CF Total Debt/Assets, TLTD log(Sales), LNTA Sales Growth, SG Dividend Dummy, DIV POS
Data Mod 1 Mod 2 Data Mod 1 Mod 2 Data Mod 1 Mod 2 Data Mod 1 Mod 2 Data Mod 1 Mod 2
−0.09 −0.13 −0.14 0.02 − 0.01 −0.04 −0.15 −0.03 −0.04 −0.18 −0.00 −0.06 −0.00 −0.05
(−2.94) (−8.77) (−8.02) (1.91) − (3.66) (−1.91) (−8.89) (−7.39) (−1.52) (−5.28) (−2.15) (−2.14) (−1.73) (−2.69)
Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02) Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02) Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02) Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02) Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02)
−0.02 −0.20 0.03 0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.00 −0.00 −0.02 −0.09
(−4.17) (−3.91) (3.84) (2.40) (−6.11) (−3.20) (−3.58) (−2.05) (−2.10) (−2.09)
Panel B:  jt (or νjt)=b0 + b1CF jt + b2TLTDjt + b3TDIV jt + b4CASHjt + b5Qjt + ǫjt, motivated from Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
Cash Flow/Assets, CF Total Debt/Assets, TLTD Dividends/Assets, TDIV Cash/Assets, CASH Tobin’s Q, Q
Data Mod 1 Mod 2 Data Mod 1 Mod 2 Data Mod 1 Mod 2 Data Mod 1 Mod 2 Data Mod 1 Mod 2
−1.00 −2.88 −1.06 3.14 − 1.78 −39.37 −17.34 −6.28 −1.32 − −0.86 0.28 1.27 0.37
(−4.28) (−6.66) (−4.67) (6.99) − (3.79) (−6.46) (−6.91) (−8.99) (−4.55) − (−2.11) (3.63) (6.04) (5.28)
Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02) Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02) Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02) Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02) Mod 2 (s=0.70) (λ0=0.02)
−0.73 −2.22 1.84 0.93 −6.33 −6.49 −1.01 −0.56 0.77 0.52
(−4.61) (−6.75) (7.36) (3.38) (−5.10) (−8.64) (−5.68) (−3.05) (6.20) (5.92)
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0Table 6 : Fama-MacBeth (1973) Cross-Sectional Regressions of the Lagrange Multiplier onto the Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
Index and the Whited and Wu (2006) Index of Financial Constraints, Model 2 with the Collateral Constraints
Using simulated panels from Model 2 with collateral constraints, this table reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regressions of the Lagrange
multiplier, νjt, onto the Kaplan and Zingles (1997, KZ) index and the Whited and Wu (2006, WW) index of ﬁnancial constraints, both separately and jointly.
We simulate 100 artiﬁcial panels, each of which has 3000 ﬁrms and 480 monthly observations, and then report the across-simulation averaged Fama-MacBeth
slopes, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics (in parentheses), and average cross-sectional R
2s. We also report the average cross-sectional
correlation between the KZ index and the WW index. Panel A reports the quantitative results from the benchmark parametrization of Model 2 with the
parameter values in Table 1. Panel B reports the results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters except that the liquidation value per unit of capital net
of liquidation costs, s, is set to be 0.70. Finally, Panel C reports the results from Model 2 using the benchmark parameters except that the ﬁxed ﬂoatation cost,
λ0, is set to be 0.02.
Panel A: Model 2 (the Benchmark Case)
KZ R
2 WW R
2 KZ WW R
2 Corr(KZ,WW)
0.0269 12.87% 0.0579 33.10% 0.0070 0.0576 36.88% 0.50
(13.13) (10.52) (3.54) (8.65)
Panel B: Model 2 (the High-Liquidation-Cost Case)
KZ R
2 WW R
2 KZ WW R
2 Corr(KZ,WW)
0.0241 21.44% 0.0748 55.41% 0.0027 0.0735 56.52% 0.56
(14.57) (13.30) (2.88) (11.75)
Panel C: Model 2 (the Low-Floatation-Cost Case)
KZ R
2 WW R
2 KZ WW R
2 Corr(KZ,WW)
0.0287 7.04% 0.1413 46.01% −0.0161 0.1548 49.04% 0.47
(2.16) (7.35) (−1.13) (6.94)
4
1Figure 1 : The Value and Investment-Policy Functions Against Underlying State Variables,
Model 1 with the Dividend Nonnegativity Constraint
This ﬁgure plots for Model 1 the market-to-book ratio (vjt/kjt, Panels A and B) and the investment-to-capital ratio
(ijt/kjt, Panels C and D) as functions of the state variables. Panels A and C plot the variables as functions of capital
stock kjt and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt, while ﬁxing the aggregate productivity xt at its long run average level
¯ x. Both Panels A and C have a class of curves corresponding to diﬀerent values of zjt, and the arrow in each panel
indicates the direction along which zjt increases. Panels B and D plot the variables as functions of capital stock kjt
and the aggregate productivity xt, while ﬁxing the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt at its long run average level ¯ zj =0.
Panels B and D have a class of curves corresponding to diﬀerent values of xt, and the arrows indicate the direction
along which x increases.
Panel A: vjt(kjt,zjt, ¯ x)/kjt Panel B: vjt(kjt, ¯ zj,xt)/kjt





























Panel C: ijt(kjt,zjt, ¯ x)/kjt Panel D: ijt(kjt, ¯ zj,xt)/kjt


























42Figure 2 : The Multiplier Against Underlying State Variables: Model 1 with the Dividend
Nonnegativity Constraint, the Benchmark Case and the Constant-Discount-Factor Case
For Model 1 under the benchmark parametrization with stochastic discount factor (γ0 = 50,γ1 = −1000), Panels
A and B plot the multiplier,  jt, against underlying state variables. Panels C and D do the same but for Model
1 with constant discount factor (γ0 = γ1 = 0). Panels A and C plot the variables as functions of capital stock kjt
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt, while ﬁxing the aggregate productivity xt at its long run average level ¯ x. Both
Panels A and C have a set of curves corresponding to diﬀerent values of zjt, and the arrow in each panel indicates
the direction along which zjt increases. Panels B and D plot the variables as functions of capital stock kjt and the
aggregate productivity xt, while ﬁxing the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt at its long run average level ¯ zj =0. Panels
B and D have a class of curves corresponding to diﬀerent values of xt, and the arrows indicate the direction along
which xt increases.
Panel A:  jt(kjt,zjt, ¯ x), Stochastic-Discount-Factor Panel B:  jt(kjt, ¯ zj,xt), Stochastic-Discount-Factor













































Panel C:  jt(kjt,zjt, ¯ x), Constant-Discount-Factor Panel D:  jt(kjt, ¯ zj,xt), Constant-Discount-Factor










































43Figure 3 : Risk and Expected Excess Return Against Underlying State Variables: Model 1
with the Dividend Nonnegativity Constraint
This ﬁgure plots for Model 1 risk (βjt, Panels A and B) and expected excess return (Et[rjt+1] − rft, Panels C and
D) as functions of the underlying state variables. Panels A and C plot the variables as functions of capital stock kjt
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt, ﬁxing the aggregate productivity xt at its long run average level ¯ x. Panels A and
C report a class of curves corresponding to diﬀerent values of zjt, and the arrow in each panel indicates the direction
along which zjt increases. Panels B and D plot the variables as functions of capital stock kjt and the aggregate
productivity xt, ﬁxing the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt at its long run average level ¯ zj =0. Panels B and D report
a class of curves corresponding to diﬀerent values of xt, and the arrow in each panel indicates the direction along
which xt increases.
Panel A: βjt(kjt,zjt, ¯ x) Panel B: βjt(kjt, ¯ zj,xt)



























Panel C: Et[rjt+1 − rft](kjt,zjt, ¯ x) Panel D: Et[rjt+1 − rft](kjt, ¯ zj,xt)












































44Figure 4 : The Value and Investment-Policy Functions Against Underlying State Variables,
Model 2 with the Collateral Constraint
This ﬁgure plots for Model 2 the ratio of market value of equity to capital (vjt/kjt, Panels A and B) and the optimal
investment-to-capital ratio (ijt/kjt, Panels C and D) as functions of underlying state variables. Panels A and C plot
the variables as functions of current-period debt, bjt, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, zjt, while ﬁxing the aggregate
productivity xt and capital stock kjt at their respective long run average levels, ¯ x and ¯ k (¯ k is determined in model
simulations). Panels A and C have a class of curves, corresponding to diﬀerent values of zjt, and the arrow in each
panel indicates the direction along which zjt increases. Panels B and D plot the variables as functions of current-
period debt, bjt, and the aggregate productivity xt, ﬁxing the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt and capital stock kjt at
their long run average levels. Panels B and D have a class of curves corresponding to diﬀerent values of xt, and the
arrows indicate the direction along which xt increases.
Panel A: vjt(¯ k,bjt,zjt, ¯ x)/kjt Panel B: vjt(¯ k,bjt, ¯ zj,xt)/kjt

























Panel C: ijt(¯ k,bjt,zjt, ¯ x)/kjt Panel D: ijt(¯ k,bjt, ¯ zj,xt)/kjt




























45Figure 5 : The Optimal Debt-Policy Function Against Underlying State Variables, Model 2
with the Collateral Constraint
This ﬁgure plots for Model 2 the optimal next-period-debt-to-capital ratio, bjt+1/kjt, as functions of underlying state
variables. Panel A plots the debt-policy function against capital stock kjt and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt, while
ﬁxing aggregate productivity xt and current-period debt bjt at their respective long run average levels, ¯ x and ¯ b (¯ b
is determined in model simulations). Panel B plots the optimal debt-policy function against capital stock kjt and
aggregate productivity xt, while ﬁxing zjt and bjt at their respective long run average levels, ¯ zj =0 and ¯ b. Panel C
plots the debt-policy function against current-period debt bjt and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt, while ﬁxing aggregate
productivity xt and capital stock kjt at their respective long run average levels, ¯ x and ¯ k (¯ k is determined in model
simulations). Finally, Panel D plots the debt-policy function against bjt and xt, while ﬁxing zjt and kjt at their
respective long run average levels. Panels A and C have a class of curves, corresponding to diﬀerent values of zjt,
and the arrow in each panel indicates the direction along which zjt increases. Panels B and D have a class of curves
corresponding to diﬀerent values of xt, and the arrows indicate the direction along which xt increases.
Panel A: bjt+1(kjt,¯ b,zjt, ¯ x)/kjt Panel B: bjt+1(kjt,¯ b, ¯ zj,xt)/kjt
































Panel C: bjt+1(¯ k,bjt,zjt, ¯ x)/kjt Panel D: bjt+1(¯ k,bjt, ¯ zj,xt)/kjt
































46Figure 6 : The Multiplier Against Underlying State Variables, Model 2 with the Collateral
Constraint
This ﬁgure plots for Model 2 the multiplier, νjt, associated with the collateral constraints as functions of underlying
state variables. Panel A plots the multiplier against capital stock kjt and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt, while ﬁxing
aggregate productivity xt and current-period debt bjt at their respective long run average levels, ¯ x and ¯ b (¯ b is
determined in model simulations). Panel B plots the multiplier against capital stock kjt and aggregate productivity
xt, while ﬁxing zjt and bjt at their respective long run average levels, ¯ zj = 0 and ¯ b. Panel C plots the multiplier
against current-period debt bjt and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity zjt, while ﬁxing aggregate productivity xt and capital
stock kjt at their respective long run average levels, ¯ x and ¯ k (¯ k is determined in model simulations). And Panel D
plots the multiplier against bjt and xt, while ﬁxing zjt and kjt at their respective long run average levels. Panels
A and C have a class of curves, corresponding to diﬀerent values of zjt, and the arrow in each panel indicates the
direction along which zjt increases. Panels B and D have a class of curves corresponding to diﬀerent values of xt,
and the arrows indicate the direction along which xt increases.
Panel A: νjt(kjt,¯ b,zjt, ¯ x) Panel B: νjt(kjt,¯ b, ¯ zj,xt)


























Panel C: νjt(¯ k,bjt,zjt, ¯ x) Panel D: νjt(¯ k,bjt, ¯ zj,xt)





















47Figure 7 : Risk and Expected Excess Return Against Underlying State Variables, Model 2
with the Collateral Constraint
This ﬁgure plots for Model 2 risk, βjt, in Panels A and B, and expected excess return, Et[rjt+1]−rft in Panels C and
D against underlying state variables. Panels A and C plot the variables against current debt, bjt, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity, zjt, while ﬁxing aggregate productivity, xt, and capital stock, kjt, at their respective long run average
levels, ¯ x and ¯ k (¯ k is determined in model simulations). In Panels A and C, we plot a class of curves, corresponding
to diﬀerent values of zjt, and the arrow in each panel indicates the direction along which zjt increases. Panels B and
D plot the variables against current debt, bjt, and aggregate productivity, xt, while ﬁxing ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity,
zjt, and capital stock, kjt, at their respective long run average levels, ¯ zj =0 and ¯ k. In Panels B and D, we report a
class of curves corresponding to diﬀerent values of xt, and the arrows indicate the direction along which xt increases.
Panel A: βjt(¯ k,bjt,zjt, ¯ x) Panel B: βjt(¯ k,bjt, ¯ zj,xt)


























Panel C: Et[rjt+1 − rft](¯ k,bjt,zjt, ¯ x) Panel D: Et[rjt+1 − rft](¯ k,bjt, ¯ zj,xt)
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